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As June 30, 1982, drew to a close and the Equal Rights
Amendment expired unratified, American women did not riot in
the streets. They did wipe the asses of children and put them to
bed, lurk on streetcorners warily until a car circled and slowed and
they got in, finish typing the last page of transcription for the following day, begin the night shift sewing plastic handbags or cleaning downtown offices, fight for their lives as fist met face and lay
their lives down as penis sliced in and out and in and out, scurry
across the street with their eyes down to avoid the man coming the
other way, and give up on covering June's bills. Not noticing as the
shadows disappeared over TVs in mental hospitals and IVs in
nursing homes, they removed their mascara, locked their doors if
they had them, set their alarm clocks, and let the day go, largely
unmarked. A few went to well-behaved demonstrations, largely unreported. In the noise and in the silence, some picked up pens and
wrote.
Why an explicit guarantee of women's equality was rejected as
part of the constituting document of the United States is a good
question, one it takes some courage to ask. The answers are bound
to be as unnerving, challenging, even anguishing as they are crucial
and urgent for law and politics. The ERA came to mean the equalt Catharine A. MacKinnon is a Visiting Scholar at the Institute for Research on
Women and Gender, Stanford University. I owe thanks to Cass Sunstein, Pauline Bart,
Twiss Butler, Pat Butler, and Karen E. Davis for their expertise, help and comments, and to
my Canadian colleagues-especially Susan Cole, Kathleen Lahey, Shiela McIntyre, Elizabeth Shilton-Lennon, Mary Eberts, Florence Henderson, Arlene Mayers, Yola Grant, Lynn
Pearlman, and my students at Osgoode Hall, York University-for confirming that legal
feminism is more than a bad dream or a good fantasy, at a time when I was really beginning
to wonder.
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ity of the sexes to those who sought it, to those who abhorred it,
and to those who found saying it in law somewhat obvious if not
yet redundant. It is hard for women to face the fact that we live in
a country that rejects our equality. In Canada, when women's demands for good sex equality guarantees in the proposed Charterof
Rights and Freedoms were not met, and a national meeting of
women to discuss women's rights under the proposed Charter was
threatened with cancellation, Canadian women spontaneously rebelled nationwide. Not only was the meeting held; not only were
the sex provisions left meaningful; but an additional provision
guaranteeing the Charter's rights "equally to male and female persons" was added.' Granted, culture and process differ. Still, one
wonders why American women, a majority of whom were said to
have wanted it, 2 let ERA go so quietly.
Jane Mansbridge's Why We Lost the ERA is less an analysis
of this loss than an example of the kind of thinking that produced
it. This book is not a searching criticism of the approach to law,
gender, and politics that failed to mobilize the masses of women in
favor of a legal guarantee of their own equality; it assumes it. It is
not an indictment of a legal regime that is stacked to require that
the sexes already be equal before sex equality can be guaranteed to

Facts from a conversation with Mary Eberts (Toronto, April 13, 1987) and from Penney Kome, The Taking of Twenty-Eight: Women Challenge the Constitution 97-105 (1983).
This comparison is instructive because nothing, cross-culturally, is quite like women's equality. It is not based on the notion that Canada is exactly like the United States or that the
constitutional situtations were the same. The resulting Canadian language also provides a
useful standard of comparison. Equality Rights under section 15 of the Canadian Charterof
Rights and Freedoms provides:
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic orgin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability. (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or
activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
Section 28 provides that sex equality rights cannot be overridden by a legislature or Parliament: "Nothwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it
are guaranteed equally to male and female persons."
2 Mansbridge recounts polls in which a majority of both sexes favored the ERA. Jane J.
Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA 16-19 (1986). Throughout, while she carefully compares
the results of various wordings of poll questions, Mansbridge takes poll results as true expressions of people's opinions on the questions they are asked. When it comes to sex, people
lie a lot. They also say one thing and do another-like say they are for the ERA and then
vote against it. Accepting poll results at face value-methodology and wording aside-may
be an occupational hazard of the political scientist, but a deeper order of skepticism seems
warranted from feminists on sex equality questions. All parenthetical page references are to
Jane J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA (1986).
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women by law. It is not an inquiry into the way those disempowered by the structure and content of a system designed to
exclude them have difficulty making it work for them. Nor is the
book an autopsy of crushed hopes or a rallying call against a despair that grows at once more rational and more luxurious daily. It
is not even a case study of how a system that seldom recognizes
women's existence, denigrates women's needs as women,3 and is
hostile to women's perspective, 4 goes about rejecting a law to guarantee women's rights. Rather, it is a wake, an almost relieved if
mordant celebration of an inert fact: after a long and tormented
life, old ERA is dead. "It is beyond harm now" (p. x). Now, we can
think about it. Academics seem to prefer their subjects as dead as
possible.
According to Mansbridge, the ERA lost because its proponents
did not play the conventional political game conventionally
enough. Feminists did not undermine or abandon our position consistently or loudly enough to assuage the fears of the opposition,
did not cave in on sex equality enough, but instead kept giving the
impression that guaranteeing sex equality would encourage or even
mandate real social change: "[legislators in wavering states became convinced that the ERA might, in fact, produce important
substantive changes-and the necessary votes were lost" (p. 2).
The leadership of the ratification movement is accordingly faulted
for lacking that all-American virtue, unprincipled pragmatism. As
Mansbridge puts it, "they preferred being right to winning" (p.
122). The volunteer activists, the life blood of the effort, are
faulted, by contrast, for wanting to win at all costs, for having such
an emotional stake in recognition of women's full citizenship by
their government that it was "worth almost any sacrifice" (p. 132).
Mansbridge, who was one of them, portrays the volunteers as pathetic and childish for being wounded by expressions of misogyny
(p. 132); their commitment is presented as fanatical, their solidarity likened to that of a religious cult (p. 178-86). Their problem

3 For example, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), holds that public funding of medically necessary abortions for indigent women is not constitutionally compelled.
4 For further discussion, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method

and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 Signs: J. Women Culture & Soc'y 635
(1983) (on the law of rape). See also American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d
323 (7th Cir. 1985), aft'd, 106 S.Ct. 1172 (1986), which holds unconstitutional a law making
pornography actionable as a civil rights violation when women are coerced into it, when it is
forced on them, when they are assaulted because of it, and when they are subordinated
through trafficking in it. This case wraps the male point of view in the first amendment,
labeling "viewpoint discrimination" a law that makes pornographers liable for sex discriminatory acts.
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was that they "care[d] even more about winning than about being
right" (p. 132). It is my experience that when women fail to sell
women out-when the opposition fails to get you to commit suicide
before they murder you, so to speak-it is said that your failure to
submit is a reason you deserve to be destroyed. Too, when you are
committed enough to women to be willing to do what it takes to
win-a posture once given some dignity by and for men under the
phrase "by any means necessary"-people say that you care about
winning too much. It seems that women who want to win something that is right should care very passionately neither about winning nor about being right. What is there to care more about in
politics? It is worth noting that Mansbridge's book does sincerely
intend to be a sympathetic insider's account of the ratification
movement.
In many ways, Why We Lost the ERA is to the ERA effort
what the ERA effort was to sex equality. Both are conventional
about law and politics. Both assume that politics as usual sets the
real ground rules for politics for women. At the core of both is the
same strange resignation garbed as realism: both wear like a tight
undergarment the assumption that most Americans do not really
want sex equality and that this view cannot be changed, 5 so that to
get an equal rights law, something sort of has to be put over on
them. Instead of facing the status quo in all its misogyny, and accepting that part of the process of winning involves changing it,
both pretend that it doesn't exist while assuming that they can do
nothing about it. Apparently both books and laws must get over in
the system as it is, although one gets the persistent impression that
both this book and this law aspire to something better.
Of course realism is desirable. But accepting the status quo as
the only reality that can be, and the other side's myths as characterizing it, is not realism for a political movement for equality; it is
suicide. Neither this book nor the ERA effort systematically comprehends that sex inequality is a problem of male dominance,' a
distinctive political system that-for feminists both to be right and
win-calls as much for a new political science as a new politics.
5This kind of thinking is evident in Mansbridge's characterization of ERA staffers:
"They differed from the rest of the American population in one major respect-they believed in, and wanted to bring about, major changes in the roles of men and women in
America" (p. 121).
6 One particularly startling example of this failure to take inequality of power seriously
is Mansbridge's analysis that a difference between pro-ERA and STOP ERA forces was that
STOP ERA only had to stop something while pro-ERA had to do something (p. 122). The
real difference is that STOP ERA had all the power of male supremacy as wind at its back.
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Mansbridge imagines neither. For one example, in all her assessments of what influenced (male) legislators to oppose the ERA, she
never considers that they might have had a real stake in sex discrimination-an economic, social, psychological, institutional, and
sexual stake, the more determinative to the degree that it is nonconscious. ERA's failure is consequently presented not as yet another male victory but as a female defeat. Indeed, both this book
and the ERA effort-because they do not face up to male dominance and therefore cannot face it down-condescend to and
blame the victim while purporting only concern for her welfare.
Mansbridge blames the ERA effort for failing to win more than she
blames what it was up against for defeating it, much like ERA activists blamed conservative women for falling to suppport their
version of sex equality more than they blamed what such women
7
were up against for undermining the ERA's appeal to them.
Neither analyzes how the dispossessed can be maneuvered into doing themselves in, a feature proponents and opponents of ERA
share.
Because neither this book nor the ERA effort seriously confronts male supremacy as the problem with which ERA had to
contend, but accept it implicitly like fish accept water, the book is
no clearer in evaluating ERA strategy than the ERA effort was in
pursuing it. Was the aim of ERA more to move the powerless or to
placate the powerful? On what analysis of sex inequality are these
emphases in tension? Is sex equality a real change or isn't it? Is it

See Andrea Dworkin, Right Wing Women (1983), for a cogent feminist analysis of the
appeal of the Right to women as women under male dominance. Mansbridge briefly displays
a peculiar but not unique opposition to calling the victimized "victims." Equating feminist
opposition to violence against women with right-wing protectionism, Mansbridge couples
"blame the victim" with "kill the messenger" when she criticizes the National Organization
for Women (NOW) for contending that the victimization of women, as evidenced by data on
violence against women, substantiated the need for a sex equality law:
The protectionist position led both men and women to expect women to be passive
victims. Victims they became. As the NOW "Position Paper on the Registration and
Drafting of Women in 1980" pointed out, in America in the 1980s, "One rape occurs
every five minutes. One out of every four American married women is a victim of wife
beating.... When the word "protection" is used, we know it costs women a great
deal." In rejecting protectionism, feminists urged women to stand on their own feet and
wield power in their own right.
(p. 69) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
It is impossible to tell from these remarks whether Mansbridge thinks NOW was exemplifying protectionism or opposing it, whether NOW got Sam Ervin and Phyllis Schlafly into
their agenda or whether Ervin and Schlafly got NOW into theirs, far less whether the ERA
would address rape or battery. The most bizarre feature underlying this analysis, however, is
the notion that criticizing the victimization of women makes women into victims, as if
women speaking of rape data makes men rape women.
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about altering power and powerlessness on the basis of sex or isn't
it? If women are no longer to make 59 cents to men's dollar, will
men make 20 cents less so the sexes can meet around 80 cents or
what?
The sense the ERA effort too often communicated of trying to
slide one by, its frequent aura of contempt for audiences, the feeling it was hiding its real agenda-none of this was lost on the opposition. But the continual revisions of the public image of what
the ERA "would do," equivocations designed to win over the opposition by reassurance, did effectively vitiate the potentially explosive organizing effect the ERA might have had on those who had
the world to gain from actual sex equality. The longer the campaign went on, the more this happened, and the more this happened, the less ERA meant. No amount of PR could keep ERA
from communicating to those with power that under ERA, yes,
women would matter. Now that would be a change. Opponents
knew this no matter how much proponents denied it, but the denying only confirmed what most powerless potential supporters already most deeply felt: nothing can make a difference, surely not a
law. Essentially, then, Mansbridge criticizes the ERA effort for
failing to follow the very strategy her book documents it pursued:
the one that defeated it. The misprision that sex equality can be
made nonthreatening and still be real, the misidentification of
what women are up against and the resulting waffling, the incredible spectacle of feminists denying that sex equality would make
much difference while urgently demanding to be given it, all this
made ERA's most recent demise a major tragedy of lost political
possibilities-unmourned in these terms by Mansbridge, however.
Mansbridge recounts the campaign's search for a sex equality
issue that would present the ERA as an appealing solution to some
aspect of women's inequality. She does not ask what made this
search so hard and largely futile in a society in which women's subordination is so pervasive. The reason for ERA's failure of analysis,
and the reason for Mansbridge's failure to analyze that failure, is
that both the ERA-at least its leading interpretation--and
Mansbridge-at least here-implicitly apply liberalism to women
and call that feminism. Both allow the liberal agenda to set the
direction and limits of ERA's agenda. In a central instance,
Mansbridge traces the way the perceived need for a new constitu8 See, e.g., Barbara A. Brown, Thomas I. Emerson, Gail Falk, and Ann E. Freedman,
The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale
L. J. 893 (1971) (ERA would make sex a prohibited legal classification).
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tional provision was undermined as the campaign progressed and
more and more sex equality rights were won under the equal protection clause-rights mostly for male plaintiffs,9 neither notes.
Why did the country need a new constitutional amendment to
solve a problem that the existing Constitution was already solving?
This only posed a problem for a provision that had no legal or political agenda of its own, beyond carrying the conventional liberal
interpretation of the equal protection clause to its extreme. Because ERA had none-a fact neither the ERA forces nor this book
face-this problem has never really been solved.
Although not all ERA's supporters took so limited a view of
what they were fighting for, the mainline liberal interpretation of
the ERA, one which reduced the problem of the subordination of
women to men to a problem of gender classification by law, was
never seriously questioned by the pro-ERA movement. 10
Mansbridge never questions it either. This is an approach to sex
equality that leaves out the social institutionalization of practices
through which women are violated, abused, exploited, and patronized by men socially-in collaboration with the state, but not only
or even primarily by the state as such. This approach leaves out
practices that have never needed to be enacted into sex classifications in law because they are plenty powerful in civil life, practices
that the state is often kept out of by law in the name of individual
rights. It is one thing for lawyers to urge this as an interpretation;
it is another for a movement to embrace its results and limits as
unquestionable; it is still another for a postmortem of the politiical
failure of the measure based on such a theory to accept it so implicitly as not even to consider that its legal theory, and the political strategy based on it, might have contributed to its loss.
Mansbridge acknowledges that the existence of the ERA
would have had a political impact that might have changed the
way existing laws are interpreted (p. 141). She does not see that
ERA's legal impact need not have been confined to being the
women's auxiliary of the equal protection clause. As a result, she
fails to analyze the specifics of ERA's potential impact so as to
take into account what a constitutional amendment could do to the
entire balance of forces on the political landscape and hence to
specific cases. As ERA doctrine did, Mansbridge assumes that legal
I See cases collected in David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women's
Rights in a Man's World, 2 L. & Inequality J. Theory & Practice 33, 34 n.4 (1984).
10 Mansbridge suggests that the approach of Brown, Emerson, Falk, and Freedman was
explicitly accepted by feminist lawyers and implicitly accepted by ERA activists (p. 128).
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doctrine immaculately produces its own progeny without messy political intercourse. As ERA doctrine did, she assumes a definition
of equality doctrine based on comparisons with men. As ERA doctrine did, she assumes an essentially male definition of what issues
are sex equality issues. In other words, both not only assume that
sex equality issues come down to women's sameness or difference
from men rather than to men's dominance over women;11 both tacitly accept a model of sex equality that is limited to those issues
men recognize as equality issues because they arise in contexts in
which men now know they sometimes treat other men arbitrarily
and irrationally. This approach, while some improvement, nevertheless precludes the distinctive abuses of women as a gender-for
example, rape, denial of reproductive control, and prostitution-from being considered sex equality issues at all.
It seems to me that a new constitutional amendment both signals and calls for a new departure. Probably as many people were
for ERA as against it because they had a breathtaking vision of all
the legal possibilities Mansbridge keeps finding "difficult to imagine." I see no reason to accept her legalistically conventional
prognostications about what ERA "would do" over their hopes and
fears. Perhaps I see this differently from Mansbridge because I am
reading for different purposes and with different premises than she
is writing, inasmuch as I do not think the ERA is "politically
dead" (p. ix) but only comatose.
All these analytical difficulties converge tellingly in her treatment of the issue of abortion rights. Dominant abortion rights and
ERA strategies on reproductive control have been based on treating forced sterilization, maternity leave and related benefits for
women, pregnancy surcharges in health insurance, and abortion
rights as anything but issues of sex discrimination (except when
women are advantaged by them). Mansbridge describes the deci12
sion not to litigate the abortion funding case of Harris v. McRae
on a sex discrimination theory as a political choice to avoid associating sex equality with abortion rights in order to help ERA's
chances of ratification (pp. 124-25). Unmentioned is that the
choice was also the result of a Supreme Court equal protection decision that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not dis11 This is discussed more fully in Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 32-46 (1987).
12 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding denial of federal funding for abortions against challenges based primarily on the right to privacy and secondarily on discrimination based on
indigency).
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crimination against women on the basis of sex, but rather a gender-neutral choice not to insure against all the risks that members
of that third sex-"pregnant persons" 1 -might face."' By the time
McRae arrived at the Supreme Court, Congress had repudiated
this result under Title VII in the case of pregnancy, but had explicitly excluded abortion1 5 and felt it could not change the constitutional result. An Equal Rights Amendment could have.
Instead of acknowledging that no man under existing technology will be personally deprived of needed abortion funding, and
reuniting abortion with pregnancy and pregnancy with sex-which
is how its benefits and its deprivations are largely experienced by
women-both Mansbridge and the ERA effort move heaven and
earth to keep them apart in the name of strategy. But once
decriminalized, this is exactly the approach that has legalized denial of support for women's reproductive needs.16 An analysis of
reproductive issues that placed them in the context of sex inequality would locate the debate in the context in which the problem is
lived: a context of lack of choice by women of the terms of sexual
access to our bodies, a context of forced sex. If something were
done about male sexual aggression and intrusion on women as the
paradigm of sex, there would be no abortion problem as we know
it, if only because dramatically fewer abortions would likely be
needed. Real sex equality would mean real sexual freedom, inccluding the power to have no mean no, hence the freedom to have
yes mean yes. Until then, women need abortions, and are denied
access to them, as women in a context of sex inequality, as an act
of sex inequality. An ERA could have given women crucial support
in such a resituated argument.
Abortion is a sex equality issue. Everyone knows it.1 7 Denial of
access to abortion denies women, and only women, a final act of
control over the reproductive consequences of male sexuality as it
largely seals women's lack of control over their time, which is what
a life is made of. Mansbridge bemoans only the extent to which
'S Pauline Bart has characterized "pregnant persons" as the third sex. Pauline Bart, In
the Best Interests of the Sperm: The Pregnancy of Judge Sorkow, Conference on the Sexual
Liberals and the Attack on Feminism (speech, New York, April 4, 1987).
1 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (equal protection); General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (same ruling under Title VII).
'5 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978) (abortion exception).
16 For further discussion, see Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in MacKinnon,
Feminism Unmodified at 93 (cited in note 11).
'7 Rumor has it that even organized crime knows, and opposed ERA because it wanted
to make abortion illegal again, having made a lot of money from it and having used it to
control their prostitutes.
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such realities were not able to be fully manipulated out of the ERA
debate (p. 118). But the current lack of success in securing access
to federal abortion funding, in making the abortion right real for
those who otherwise have least access to it, suggests that denying
women's experience and ignoring gender divisions in legal doctrine
may make not only bad law and lousy politics but also ineffective
strategy."' It is even worth considering that here, as elsewhere,
Mansbridge may attribute ERA's death to failing to go far enough
in the direction that killed it.
Neither the ERA effort nor this book inquires into whether an
ERA that addressed the deep realities of women's condition might
have mobilized the kind of uprising of women that only a deeply
changed vision of society is able to do. In a teleological approach to
political explanation, when Mansbridge asks why ERA failed, she
does not look at what did not happen but only at what did. What
"' I came across other analytic and informational lacunae as well. For example, in the
discussion of discrimination in auto insurance, Mansbridge buys the insurance lobby line
that sex discrimination benefits women when she assumes that sex-based auto insurance
rates are to women's financial advantage (pp. 41, 151, and accompanying notes). NOW documented in 1982, however, that sex-based auto insurance rates for women overcharged
women by 30 percent. Because men, on average, drive more miles than women, see NOW
advertisement, N.Y. Times (East Coast edition, June 3, 1982), unisex rates-sex-declassified, the conventional ERA solution-are even less of a solution, because under them,
women pay auto insurance at the rate at which men need it. Thus unisex rates are immensely profitable for insurance companies and costly for women. Pennsylvania NOW v.
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., No. R86-9-6 (1987) (unisex auto rates challenged as
sex discriminatory). Further, Mansbridge suggests that Title VII was eliminating sex discrimination in pensions and thereby made ERA unnecessary in this context. But she does
not mention that both of the major Supreme Court cases on this issue-in a break with the
usual practice-refused to give retroactive relief, leaving in place existing plans that had
been found to have discriminated against women. Compare Title VII cases where women
were harmed and denied retroactive relief, Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 463 U.S.
1073 (1983), and Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), with
Title VII cases where men were harmqd and granted retroactive relief, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445 (1976).
The discussion of pornography contains egregious factual errors, although they may not
be Mansbridge's fault. The footnote on the pornography ordinances Andrea Dworkin and I
conceived and drafted states that we "tried to read [those who opposed our ordinance] out
of the feminist movement" (p. 309 n.16). We did point out that pimps are not feminists and
defending them is not feminist, which is not the same. Contrary to Mansbridge's implication, we only "pressed" (id.) municipalities to pass our ordinance when and where expressly
requested. Our law does not allow women to sue "on a tort basis" (id.) but on a sex discrimination basis. Our law does not cover material that is "sexually graphic" (id.). It is said our
legislation "was explicitly not gender neutral; it addressed itself only to men's oppression of
women" (id.). The legislation expressly provides that men who can show harm may sue also.
The ordinance is expressly sex-specific in its identification of a sex-specific harm, and expressly gender neutral in its overall design. I am told, however, that this paragraph was
edited by the publisher without Mansbridge's knowledge or permission and does not reflect
her views on the ordinance.
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if sex equality were not limited, as the ERA effort and this book
assume, to the way the white male liberal cabal of lawyers, publishers, professors, the media, and their "domesticated" feminists
have defined it? What if, instead, issues of sexual abuse of children, denial of the abortion choice, rape, battery, prostitution, pornography, and sex-based de facto job segregation were core examples around which a critique of the denial of civil rights to women
were forged? What if, when we talked ERA, we talked about state
complicity in male violence against women through writing and administering rape laws from the viewpoint of the reasonable rapist;
misogynist police practices in domestic violence calls that relegate
assault on women to the lowest category of concern; collaboration
of law enforcement and law itself in the terrorization and stigmatization of child victims of sexual abuse, many of them girls; biased
enforcement of biased laws against prostitution so that prostitutes
(most of them women) are harassed and violated while pimps and
johns (men) are allowed to ensure that prostitution, something
men made a crime, will continue to exist for their pleasure; useless
and dangerous obscenity laws that cover for the pornography industry, provide its design format, and decry pornography in public
while nonenforcement and built-in unenforceability guarantee its
availability in private, ignoring documented harms to women from
its production and consumption?19 What if we called all this "state
action" in the sex equality area?
What if, when we talked ERA, we criticized the legal standards under Title VII that essentially assume that the status quo
is nondiscriminatory, stacking the burden of proof so that the tools
20
we are given embody the problem they are supposed to solve?
What if, when we talked ERA, the equal protection requirement
that discrimination be proved intentional were criticized as a protection for bigots, a good many of whom so sincerely believe that
women are a lower form of life that hurting us never crosses their
minds as they hurt us, who do not even take account of our human
19These harms were documented in Public Hearings on Ordinances to Add Pornography as Discrimination Against Women, Gov't Operations Committee of the Minneapolis
City Council (Dec. 12-13, 1983) (statements by researchers, clinicians, scholars, victims, and
other citizens documenting and debating pornography's harms to women).
20 Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (defendant need merely
"articulate" a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a hiring decision to defeat a prima
facie case); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's proferred reason was
merely a pretext for discrimination).
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existence enough to form an intention to discriminate against us?2 1
What if, when we talked ERA, we talked about how it might support laws that recognize abuses of women that have never been
recognized, abuses just now coming out of our silence, abuses that
have previously been guaranteed as rights to men under existing
law, abuses like pornography? Just as slaves once had nothing to
weigh against the laws that made them property, women abused
through pornography now have nothing-nothing of comparable
constitutional magnitude-to weigh against the laws that make
them "speech." 22
Strikingly consonant with the general direction of this critique
is the original language of Alice Paul's Equal Rights Amendment
as submitted in 1923: "Men and women shall have equal rights
throughout the United States and every place subject to its jurisdiction." 23 The comparatively backwards and bloodless 1943 revision-"Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or any State on account of
sex"24 -arguably introduced the structural liberalism that undermined ERA legally and politically. In 1923, equal rights were to be
affirmatively granted to men and women by name. Period. In 1943,
equality of rights in a category called sex were to be precluded
from denial by government. No one was given rights where government was not already involved. Women and men became "sex," an
abstraction, equality of which already seemingly existed somewhere where government was not.
Suppose the original language and the stance it suggested had
been pursued. Might we have been able to mobilize women's sexbased physical and economic insecurity and vulnerability and
desperation? Women's sex-based personal indignity, sex-based
boredom, and sex-based despair? Women's sex-based fear and invisibility and hopelessness and exhaustion and silence and selfhate? If that were loosed, what could stand against it? If the question is more why we did not win than why we lost, could not the
failure to mobilize women's pain and suppressed discontent be at
Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) requires that sex
discrimination be intentional to violate the equal protection clause.
22 American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 106
S.Ct. 1172 (1986) makes women speech.
2s S.J. Res. 21, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 10, 1923), in 65 Cong. Rec. 150 (Dec. 3, 1923Jan. 15, 1924) (Senator Curtis); H.J. Res. 75, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 13, 1923), in 65
Cong. Rec. 285 (Dec. 3, 1923-Jan. 15, 1924) (Representative Anthony).
2, Proposed Equal-Rights Amendment New Form, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb 2, 1944),
in 90 Cong. Rec 1039 (Jan. 10-Feb. 8, 1944) (referring to the 1943 revision).
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least part of the answer? At a minimum, I believe that this real
damage of sexism is what women were dealing with the night ERA
went down, too submerged in the problem probably even to notice
the passing of what might have helped in its solution-especially
since almost no one who took up pens and wrote, then or since, has
even mentioned that it might have helped.

